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ABSTRACT
Negotiations pursuant to the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action appear likely to lead to a
2015 Paris agreement that embodies a hybrid climate policy architecture, combining top-down
elements, such as for monitoring, reporting, and verification, with bottom-up elements, including
“nationally determined contributions” from each participating country, detailing what it intends
to do to reduce emissions, based on its national circumstances. For such a system to be costeffective—and thus more likely to achieve significant global emissions reductions—a key feature
will be linkages among regional, national, and sub-national climate policies. By linkage, we mean
a formal recognition by a greenhouse gas mitigation program in one jurisdiction (a regional,
national, or sub-national government) of emission reductions undertaken in another jurisdiction
for purposes of complying with the first jurisdiction’s mitigation program. We examine how
a future international policy architecture could help facilitate the growth and operation of a
robust system of international linkages of regional, national, and sub-national policies. Several
design elements merit serious consideration for inclusion in the Paris agreement, either directly
or by establishing a process for subsequent international elaboration. At the same time, including
detailed linkage rules in the core agreement is not desirable because this could make it difficult
for rules to evolve in light of experience.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, adopted by the Conference of the Parties (COP)
to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 2011, the
parties agreed to develop a new legal instrument “under the Convention applicable to all Parties,”
for adoption at the Twenty-First Conference of the Parties (COP-21) in December 2015, in Paris
(UNFCCC, 2012). Although the negotiations are still at a relatively early stage, it appears likely
that the 2015 agreement will reflect a hybrid climate policy architecture—one that combines topdown elements, such as for monitoring, reporting, and verification, with bottom-up elements,
including “nationally determined contributions,” detailing what a country intends to do to reduce
emissions, based on domestic political feasibility and other factors (Bodansky and Diringer, 2014).
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To enhance the cost-effectiveness of such a system—and thus the likelihood of achieving
significant global emissions reductions—a key feature will be linkages among regional, national,
and sub-national climate policies. By linkage, we mean a formal recognition by a greenhouse gas
(GHG) mitigation program in one jurisdiction (a regional, national, or sub-national government)
of emission reductions undertaken in another jurisdiction for purposes of complying with the
first jurisdiction’s mitigation program.2 Linkage can be very straightforward, as with the bilateral
recognition of allowances under two cap-and-trade regimes, but linkage can also take place
among a heterogeneous set of policy instruments, such as between systems of performance
standards, carbon taxes, and cap-and-trade. Linkage is a core focus of one key track of the current
international climate negotiations, namely the Framework for Various Approaches (FVA), which
originated at COP-13 in Bali, Indonesia in 2007 (UNFCCC, 2008, 1(b)(5)), and which seeks to
ensure that various types of national mitigation policies meet common standards.
This paper analyzes theoretical issues relating to linkage among heterogeneous climate policy
instruments and then applies this analysis concretely to the 2015 Paris agreement. It examines how
the agreement could help facilitate the growth and operation of a robust system of international
linkages of regional, national, and sub-national policies, as well as how inappropriate or excessive
rules could obstruct effective, bottom-up linkage.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes what is known about linkage in its various
forms. We identify the key economic and political advantages of and challenges to linkage, and
examine sources of interest and pressure from governments and the private sector. The section
concludes with an empirical review of existing and proposed climate policy linkages, and a list of
key lessons that have been learned to date.
In Section 3, we examine conceptually the role of linkage in a future international climate
agreement. Specifically, we postulate a set of generic needs for facilitating and regulating linkage,
examine the implications of the Durban Platform, and describe a small set of potential design
elements to facilitate linkage in a future international agreement. Section 4 of the paper transitions
from concepts to more concrete design issues in the context of international law. Alternative types
of international instruments are considered. The section concludes with an examination of how
key linkage design elements can be treated in a future international agreement. Section 5 of the
paper offers some conclusions.

2

Our use of the term linkage should not be confused with the concept of linkage in the international relations literature, where it refers to
negotiated agreements between countries in which multiple issues are negotiated and “linked” for purposes of coming to agreement on
the overall package. See, for example, Haas (1980).
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2. UNDERSTANDING LINKAGE
Separate and distinct policy instruments in different political jurisdictions may be linked together,
essentially through mutual recognition and crediting for compliance. As discussed below (and
in greater length in Metcalf and Weisbach [2012]), linkage could occur between cap-and-trade
and tax systems, between either of those systems and non-market regulatory systems, or among
non-market regulatory systems. Linkage can also be direct or indirect, as we explain below, and
bilateral or multilateral. We begin by utilizing the example of direct linkage between two cap-andtrade systems, not because this will necessarily be the most common or important form of linkage
in the long term, but because it is the most obvious and easiest to understand.

2.1 Direct and Indirect Linkage
Direct linkage occurs when an agreement is reached between two cap-and-trade systems to accept
allowances (or credits) from the other jurisdiction for purposes of compliance with the local cap.
This can occur on a one-for-one basis, where an allowance from one jurisdiction is accepted in
place of an allowance for the same amount of emissions in another jurisdiction (Ranson and
Stavins, 2013a,b), or a trading ratio (exchange rate) can apply to allowance (or credit) transfers
between the two systems.3 Direct linkage can be bilateral (two-way), where both systems accept
allowances or credits from the other system for compliance, or unilateral (one-way), where only
one of two systems allows credits from the other for compliance (Ranson and Stavins, 2013b).
Indirect linkage occurs when two systems do not accept allowances from each other, but both
accept allowances (or credits) from a common third party (Ranson and Stavins, 2013b). For
example, cap-and-trade systems in two jurisdictions might both allow firms to comply using offsets
purchased from an emission reduction credit system. By accepting credits (or allowances) from
a common source (jurisdiction), both cap-and-trade-allowance markets influence the common
offset market, and in turn both influence allowance prices (and compliance costs) in each other’s
markets.

3

If systems wish to preserve different levels of ambition, they can put in place a number of mechanisms to do so. First, they can recognize
allowances from the other jurisdiction with an exchange rate. For example, a country with a more aggressive cap might agree to accept
allowances from a country with a less aggressive cap but apply an exchange rate so that, for example, three tons of emission allowances
from the other country would be required for one ton of compliance domestically (Burtraw et al., 2013). Second, a country can place a
limit on the use of allowances from other systems. Third, a country could require a payment to “top up” each foreign allowance approved
for compliance purposes. For example, if an allowance from a system with a less ambitious cap (and an allowance price of $10) were used
for compliance in a system with a more ambitious cap (and an allowance price of $25), the complying entity in the second system could
be required to surrender the foreign allowance together with a payment of $15 to account for the difference. Note that the fee in this
type of top-up approach could be set below the difference in allowance value (i.e., at less than $15 in the example given) to preserve some
positive incentive for trading.
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2.2 Linkage among Homogeneous and Heterogeneous Policy Instruments
Cap-and-trade programs provide the most straightforward opportunity for linkage, by allowing
firms (emission sources) in one jurisdiction to comply either with local allowances or equivalent
allowances from another, linked system. However, a variety of issues arise even in such
straightforward linkages (Jaffe, Ranson, and Stavins, 2009; Ranson and Stavins, 2013b; Burtraw
et al. 2013). These include technical issues, such as monitoring, reporting, and verification of
emissions, and the structure and coordination of allowance tracking systems; emissions reduction
targets (for example, stringency of caps, and the scope and timing of coverage); allocation of
allowances (in particular, measures to address competitiveness and leakage); cost containment
mechanisms (rules for banking and borrowing, use and certification of offsets, price floors and
ceilings); and legal frameworks (for example, penalties for non-compliance, market regulation,
contingency processes for de-linking).
It is highly unlikely that all countries will employ national cap-and-trade instruments as their
means of reducing GHG emissions under the 2015 agreement. Other instruments include,
among other options, carbon taxes or fees, emission reduction credit systems (ERCs) such as the
Clean Development Mechanism, and emission intensity trading systems. Countries may also
rely on more traditional regulatory approaches (for example, mandated technology standards
or minimum emission reduction requirements). Hence, it is important to consider options for
linking different types of policy instruments (Hahn and Stavins, 1999; Metcalf and Weisbach,
2012). In this context, we think of linkage as a strategy to narrow or eliminate differences in
the shadow price of carbon (that is, the marginal cost of abatement) through policies that allow
carbon regimes in different political jurisdictions to interact in various ways.
For example, firms that are subject to a carbon tax might be allowed to pay taxes at a higher level
than they owe based on their emissions, and sell certified Emission Tax Payment Credits (ETPCs)
to firms that are operating under a cap-and-trade program. Within the cap-and-trade program,
firms could use ETPCs just as they would the equivalent quantity of allowances for purposes
of compliance. Conversely, firms under a cap-and-trade program could sell allowances to firms
required to pay a carbon tax, allowing the purchasing firm to lower its tax obligation by the
amount of allowances it submits for retirement. Likewise, either a carbon tax or a cap-and-trade
system could be linked with policies that provide subsidies for emissions reductions, which could
be traded like ERCs to be used in place of allowances to comply with a cap-and-trade program,
or as ETPCs for compliance with a carbon tax (Metcalf and Weisbach, 2012).4

4

Mexico’s recently enacted carbon tax allows the use of offset credits from projects under the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM) in lieu of tax payments (ICAP, 2014).
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In principle, market-based mechanisms5 (taxes, subsidies, and cap and trade) could be linked with
a performance-based regulatory system. If the regulation is in the form of a quantity standard
(e.g., tons of carbon-dioxide-equivalent reduction), firms could buy allowances or ETPCs from
another market to meet the required quantity of reduction, or to achieve reductions in excess
of the regulatory minimum and then sell additional reductions as ERCs. Intensity standards
may be translated into quantity standards at the source or firm level (per total output, total
sales, or whatever denominator the regulation prescribes), thus allowing for linkage (Metcalf and
Weisbach, 2012).
Technology standards present a considerably greater challenge, because it is difficult to verify the
additionality of emissions reductions from meeting or exceeding a technology standard. Even
a one-way link, which might allow firms facing the technology mandate to purchase offsets or
allowances from another system, would be challenging to implement. In principle, credits could be
used to attribute reductions to companies that outperform expected emissions from a technology
standard; these credits could then be sold to foreign markets (Metcalf and Weisbach, 2012).

2.3 Advantages of Linkage
Linkage offers a variety of economic and political advantages. These advantages have been key
motivating forces behind linkages that have already been established or are being planned.

2.3.1 Economics
Linkage allows for voluntary exchanges across systems, and thereby facilitates cost-effectiveness,
that is, achievement of the lowest-cost emissions reductions across the set of linked systems,
minimizing both the costs for individual countries as well as the overall cost of meeting the
collective cap.6 Perhaps the key argument for allowing linkage in the UN climate change regime
is that, by reducing costs, linkage allows countries to adopt more ambitious policies. In addition,
linkage has a number of subsidiary benefits. By increasing the number of allowance buyers and/
5

We define market-based mechanisms as policy instruments that alter the price of emitting activities relative to non-emitting activities
based on the carbon content of the former. Examples of market-based policies include taxes and cap-and-trade systems that explicitly
price emissions. They also include subsidies to clean technologies (for example, feed-in tariffs or Renewable Portfolio Standards) that
alter the price of non-emitting energy sources relative to emitting sources. Note that some market-based mechanisms would be classified
as economic instruments (for example, taxes). Market-based approaches differ from traditional command-and-control approaches in
important ways: these approaches do not prohibit emissions by individual firms (although there may be an economy-wide limit as in the
case of a cap-and-trade system); rather they put a price on emissions at the margin. Moreover, that marginal price is common across all
emitters in equilibrium. The key advantage of a market-based approach is that it allows firms in the market to determine who will emit
greenhouse gases based on the firm-specific value of emissions, rather than dictating who must reduce emissions.

6

Although this is an economic merit of linkage, for political reasons price equalization may not be a near-term goal (Ranson and Stavins,
2013a), as we discuss later.

HARVARD PROJECT ON CLIMATE AGREEMENTS • HARVARD KENNEDY SCHOOL » 5

or sellers across linked cap-and-trade systems, linkage tends to increase market liquidity (Ranson
and Stavins, 2013a). To the extent that linkage reduces carbon price differentials across countries
or regions, it also reduces the potential for competitive distortions caused by “leakage” (where
leakage refers to emissions-generating sources or activities moving to jurisdictions with less
stringent climate policies).
Moreover, by expanding the scope and size of the market for carbon allowances, linkage can
mitigate allowance price shocks caused by extreme weather or other unexpected events (Burtraw
et al., 2013) and thereby reduce price volatility, although in the process, linkage also can transmit
price volatility from one system to another. Finally, linkage can reduce the market power of
individual market participants. Large buyers or sellers of emissions in a small market may be
able to exercise market power, and strategically affect allowance prices (Wiener, 1999, Metcalf
and Weisbach, 2012). But this potential is diminished when the overall market is expanded,
provided that the same entity is not a significant allowance buyer or seller in both of the linked
jurisdictions.

2.3.2 Politics
One possible political motivation for linkage is the ability of a country to demonstrate global
leadership, as some jurisdictions may see political benefits from supporting global action on climate
change. For example, the European Commission has indicated that linking the European Union
Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) with other cap-and-trade systems “offers several potential
benefits, including…supporting global cooperation on climate change” (European Commission,
2014c). The prospect of linkage may allow nations to exert greater diplomatic influence on
unlinked, free-riding nations, encouraging them to take action on climate change.
Likewise, international linkage agreements can offer domestic political benefits, as leaders can
point to linkage as a sign of “momentum” for increasing participation in systems similar to (or at
least compatible with) their domestic climate policies. Linked systems may also provide regulatory
stability, attractive from the point of view of affected firms, in the sense that it may be more
difficult to introduce changes in an emission-reduction scheme when those changes require some
sort of coordination with other countries with linked emissions systems.
There are also administrative benefits from linking that come from sharing knowledge about the
design and operation of a carbon-pricing system. Quebec may benefit in this way from its linkage
with the larger California cap-and-trade system. Also, linkage may reduce administrative costs
through the sharing of such costs and the avoidance of duplicative services. Making the combined
system run more smoothly can insulate both participating systems from political attacks.
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Political support for linkage may also come from the capture of greater local co-benefits, such
as reductions of emissions of correlated pollutants (Flachsland et al., 2009). If one jurisdiction
has a lower GHG price than another before linkage, linkage may provide a market for additional
emissions reductions in the low-price jurisdiction that yields additional co-benefits to that
jurisdiction. Conversely, a high-price jurisdiction may resist linking with a low-price system
because linkage could mean fewer domestic emissions reductions, with the loss of related cobenefits. This concern was raised during debates in California regarding whether to link with
Quebec’s cap-and-trade system.
It is possible that linkage and the set of harmonized rules and procedures that accompany linkage
may provide cover for politically difficult decisions. Monitoring and verification procedures that
are opposed by particular interest groups, for example, can be justified on grounds that these
procedures are needed to realize the benefits that accrue from linking with other jurisdictions.
Linking heterogeneous systems can create political flexibility to pursue the domestic policy
instrument that is most feasible politically, while retaining the option to link with other types of
systems. This may enable greater participation in linking despite diverse political tastes (Metcalf
and Weisbach, 2012). Finally, well-designed linkage systems may pave the way for other forms of
cooperation among nations.

2.4 Challenges of Linkage
The advantages of linkage are real, but linkage also brings with it a number of challenges. Some
of these challenges are economic, others are political.

2.4.1 Economics
First, it is important to recognize that linkage has the potential to improve the cost-effectiveness
of a pair of linked policies only if there is sufficient environmental integrity in both systems
with respect to their monitoring, reporting, and verification requirements (Ranson and Stavins,
2013a). If one jurisdiction in a linked pair or large set of linked jurisdictions lacks the capacity
or motivation to track emissions and emission allowances accurately (and/or the capacity or
motivation to measure and verify offset credits), these loopholes will be exploited throughout
the system, damaging the cost-effectiveness of the full set of linked policies. This can create
significant barriers to linkage between nations with different levels of environmental and financial
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management (Metcalf and Weisbach, 2012).7 On the other hand, linkage could encourage the
development of stronger systems: a desire to link between two countries or regions might induce
the party with the weaker system to improve the environmental integrity of its system in order to
persuade the other party to link.
Linkage itself can undermine environmental integrity. For example, linkage can result in double
counting if transfers between countries are not properly accounted for and if, as a result, the same
emissions reduction is counted towards compliance in more than one national system.
Strategic behavior could also produce adverse economic consequences in a set of linked systems.
In a game-theoretic analysis of two countries setting their emissions caps (and thereby, their
reduction targets), Helm (2003) examines the incentives of two countries that wish to link but
assign different values to emissions reductions. Suppose that Country A adopts an ambitious
emissions cap that leads to high allowance prices, reflecting the high value it places on emissions
reductions. Country B may assign a lower value to its emissions reductions, and thus sets a
domestic cap on emissions that produces a lower domestic allowance price than Country A. If
Country B anticipates linking with Country A, it may have an incentive to loosen its domestic
cap even more, so that the post-linkage emissions price more closely reflects its domestic benefits
from emissions reductions. This can lead to disparities in ambition that could complicate efforts
to link.8 However, multilateral linkage would reduce the power of one jurisdiction to influence
the international price by adjusting its own cap.
Even if a linkage is established, it may not be executed in terms of actual trades if transaction
costs inhibit trading. As we discuss later, harmonized or uniform multilateral rules can facilitate
effective linkage by lowering transaction costs. This is true of harmonized rules both for national
policies, such as emissions trading, and for bilateral linkage agreements. Private actors can trade
more easily between different jurisdictions if the traded units are subject to similar or identical
rules in the two jurisdictions.

7

A nation with high environmental integrity can seek to protect against such risks in its bilateral linkage agreements with other nations
by linking only with nations that have comparable standards, by otherwise ensuring the environmental integrity of whatever trades are
facilitated under linkage (ensuring that “a ton is a ton”), or by applying an exchange rate to trades. A nation can also seek to protect the
integrity of its national system against the risk that nations with which it is linked may seek to link with third nations that have lower
standards by reserving the right to cancel its linkage agreements, or by requiring that linkages with third nations obtain its consent. But
as more and more nations join a single linked system, these options become increasingly cumbersome. Pizer and Yates (2014) note that
how delinking occurs in practice can have significant implications for the overall cost of carbon abatement policies. They discuss the
implication of this finding for linkage agreements.

8

In a closely related game-theoretic analysis, Holtsmark and Sommervoll (2012) examine the incentives that nations face when they
set their national emissions-reduction targets under a bottom-up pledge-and-review system. They find that if countries anticipate that
international emissions trading will be implemented, they have incentives to establish less ambitious reduction targets than if trading were
not anticipated.
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2.4.2 Politics
While linkage has the potential to improve aggregate cost-effectiveness across linked jurisdictions,
it can also have significant distributional implications between and within jurisdictions (Ranson
and Stavins, 2013a).9 Firms that were allowance buyers (firms with high abatement costs) in the
jurisdiction with the higher pre-link allowance price will be better off as a result of the allowance
price changes brought about by linking, as will allowance sellers (firms with low abatement costs)
in the jurisdiction with the lower pre-link allowance price. Conversely, allowance sellers in the
jurisdiction with the higher pre-link allowance price and allowance buyers in the jurisdiction with
the lower pre-link allowance price will be hurt by the allowance price change that results from the
link. For the jurisdiction that faces higher prices post-linkage, this means greater transfers from
buyers to sellers (Newell, Pizer, and Raimi, 2013).
An increase in the volume of trades (as a result of linkage) may also have distributional implications
and attendant political consequences, depending on the relative influence of buyers and sellers in
the jurisdiction (Ranson and Stavins, 2013a). Within jurisdictions, the potential also exists for
elites in developing countries to capture allowances from domestic cap-and-trade systems and sell
them into linked markets to the detriment of the local economy (Somanathan, 2010).
In some cases, jurisdictions that have established emission-reduction policies may be motivated,
at least in part, by a political desire to provide incentives for long-term investment in domestic
abatement activities. The carbon price brought about by a cap-and-trade system or carbon tax
may be expected to induce greater domestic development of low-carbon technologies, but existing
carbon taxes and cap-and-trade systems have had little if any impact on technology innovation,
presumably because of relatively low carbon prices (Calel and Dechezlepretre, 2012). If a system
with a high allowance price links with a system with a lower allowance price, the firms in the
system with higher abatement costs will have less incentive to find innovative ways to reduce their
emissions, since they can opt instead to purchase allowances at the new lower price. The result
may be less technological innovation than expected under the emissions policy pre-linkage.10
Beyond such long-term investment impacts, linkage may raise political concerns by reducing
domestic environmental ambition (in the sense that domestic emission reductions will be less
than what they would have been without linkage) in the short term. In existing cap-and-trade
systems, rules limiting the use of foreign offsets may indicate a desire to ensure domestic emissions

9

Distributional implications across jurisdictions pertain specifically to capital flows from countries with higher prices to those with lower
prices. As discussed in section 3.2.1, these flows can create their own political problems for climate policy.

10

This holds if technology innovation is convex in allowance prices or if innovation is a function of the maximum price across systems. The
opposite would hold if innovation is concave in prices.
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abatement, even when domestic actions are more costly.11 This concern appears to have motivated
the design of the EU ETS in its third commitment period (2013-20), as well as the design of the
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) in the northeastern United States (RGGI, 2014c),
and the cap-and-trade system under California Assembly Bill 32, the Global Warming Solutions
Act of 2006 (AB 32) (Ranson and Stavins, 2013a).
In some cases, the desire to ensure a minimum level of domestic mitigation may be motivated
by the belief that domestic mitigation provides co-benefits unrelated to climate change, such as
reduction of localized air-pollutants (Flachsland et al., 2009). Linkage that reduces abatement in
the local system may forfeit such politically important co-benefits. It is also possible, however, that
the ability to link to other systems (and so enjoy the opportunity to achieve emission reductions
at lower cost) may provide political support for greater ambition in mitigation goals.
Finally, linkage presents the political challenge of ceding some degree of national (or other
jurisdictional) autonomy. Before two jurisdictions link, they may need to agree on how to
reconcile design features that they have separately established for their respective systems (Ranson
and Stavins, 2013b). As those design features may represent a compromise between competing
stakeholder interests within a country, any changes could pose political hurdles.

2.5 Interest and Pressure
Interest in linkage and pressure to establish linkages can be expected and have been observed from
governments, firms with compliance obligations, and multilateral organizations. The EU, for
example, has used participation in the ETS as a precondition for full EU membership (Ellerman
and Buchner, 2007). Likewise, the EU has announced that it will delink with developing countries
post-2020 by ceasing to accept Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) offset credits until a
more robust international emissions reduction market is defined (Lippman, 2014).12
Companies with compliance responsibilities have demonstrated their interest in linkage through
their membership in the International Emissions Trading Association (IETA), which has publicly
supported linkage of emissions trading systems (IETA, 2014a). According to IETA, “linking
enables companies to capture a wider range of mitigation opportunities to keep costs down”
(IETA 2014b). Firms in a system with relatively high allowance prices will see an advantage in

11

These political considerations are distinct from economic considerations, such as concern about the ability to verify the quality of
international offsets. Limiting or disallowing foreign offsets in certain instances may be more cost effective than expending resources to
ensure the quality and additionality of foreign offsets.

12

Between now and 2020, the EU in principle accepts CDM offset credits, but credits from projects registered since January 2013 are
eligible only if the project is hosted by a Least Developed Country. The current surplus of ETS allowances, however, means that CDM
credits are not needed at present.
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linking with a system that has lower allowance prices, as access to lower-cost allowances will
reduce their compliance costs. Firms in a lower-priced system, however, may be reluctant to link
for the same reason (because they would expect to see higher allowance prices), but even these
firms might see benefits from linkage in terms of increased liquidity, greater price stability, and
reduced opportunities for sellers to exercise market power, as mentioned above.
Offsetting that potential reluctance is the opportunity for firms with low marginal abatement
costs to receive rents in the form of payments for emission reductions in excess of their abatement
costs. In addition, one-way links with ERC or offset programs are also popular among firms with
compliance responsibilities, provided that offset prices are below allowance prices in the relevant
existing cap-and-trade system.
Finally, multilateral organizations have shown interest in linkage. The World Bank’s Globally
Networked Carbon Markets Initiative strives to provide a reliable process for valuing the climate
mitigation impact of emission-reduction units from different nations, providing “exchange rates”
for allowances or credits to be traded between national or regional markets, even if these markets
are not formally linked. As currently conceived, the Initiative would include independent rating
agencies, an International Carbon Reserve, and an International Settlement Platform (World
Bank, 2014b). The World Bank has also established a Partnership for Market Readiness to prepare
developing countries for implementing market-based systems, as discussed in section 4.3.4.

2.6 Experience
As of early 2014, 20 regional, national, or sub-national cap-and-trade systems were either
operating or scheduled to launch in 40 countries (not including emissions trading under the
Kyoto Protocol). These include the EU ETS, RGGI, seven regional pilots in China, and emissions
trading systems in California, Kazakhstan, New Zealand, Quebec, Switzerland, and Tokyo (World
Bank, 2014a). Of these, most had established or proposed at least one international linkage with
another cap-and-trade or credit system.
These links fall into four general categories: one-way and two-way linkages between cap-and-trade
systems; one-way linkages between cap-and-trade systems and credit systems; implicit linkages
via national trading under Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol; and various types of non-traditional
linkage.
The first panel in Table 1 lists former, existing and planned direct linkages between cap-and-trade
systems.13 There have been two cases of planned one-way linkages, both now abandoned. One
13

The two-way linkages described in Table 1 can be bilateral or multilateral. We distinguish them in the table by denoting the former as
“Two-way” and the latter as “Multilateral.”The multilateral linkages are all two-way.
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was Australia’s former plan to accept EU ETS allowances beginning in July 2015. Due to the
election of a new government in September 2013, Australia rescinded its existing carbon tax and
planned cap-and-trade system in July 2014, resulting in the termination of this announced oneway linkage. The other example of one-way linkage was the language in RGGI’s 2006 amendment
to its MOU that allowed participants to use allowances from foreign cap-and-trade systems when
and if RGGI allowance prices exceeded a specified trigger price (the trigger price started at $10
per ton of CO2 in 2005 and increased by roughly 2 percent each year). Because RGGI prices have
remained well below the trigger price, this one-way linkage option was never exercised. The 2013
updates to the RGGI Model Rule ended this conditional linkage (RGGI, 2013b, 3).
Table 1 also lists several proposed bilateral linkages. The most prominent example is the agreement
between California and Quebec to link their cap-and-trade systems and hold joint permit auctions
beginning in the fall of 2014. Although Australia formerly had plans for a two-way linkage with
the EU ETS beginning in 2018, the repeal of Australia’s cap-and-trade system ended this link as
well (ClimateWire, 2013).14
Table 1 includes two examples of multilateral linkage: between the EU ETS nations and between
the RGGI states. While these are not technically linkages between independent cap-and-trade
systems, both involve countries (in the case of the EU ETS) or sub-national states (in the case of
RGGI) negotiating an agreement to merge their carbon markets. Because of the similarities to
linkage, it is useful to view such systems as sets of linked cap-and-trade programs (Ellerman and
Buchner, 2007).
The second panel in Table 1 lists existing and proposed one-way linkages in which cap-andtrade systems have agreed to accept offsets from ERC systems. By far the most important credit
system, in terms of the volume of credits created, is the Kyoto Protocol’s CDM. As Table 1 shows,
several cap-and-trade systems, including those of the EU, Switzerland, and New Zealand, have
established such one-way linkages with the CDM. Of these, the EU has been the dominant
purchaser of CDM credits: as of 2011, over 80 percent of issued CERs were surrendered by EU
ETS participants or were being held in EU carbon registry accounts (Shishlov and Bellassen,
2012, 16-17).
The third panel in Table 1 lists examples of heterogeneous linkage. Under Mexico’s recently
established carbon tax on fossil fuels (initially set at $3.50 per ton carbon dioxide equivalent
[tCO2e]), firms may elect to use offset credits from CDM projects developed in Mexico to meet
all or part of their tax liability. The precise form of the interaction between these two instruments
14

Less defined, but a potential precursor of a bilateral linkage, is a Memorandum of Understanding signed on July 28, 2014 by the Governor
of California and the government of Mexico to coordinate climate policy efforts, including the possible development and implementation
of “carbon pricing systems and other market-based instruments” (Kahn, 2014). Also, in 2013, California, Oregon, Washington, and
British Columbia established the Pacific Coast Collaborative to coordinate climate policies.
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is still being developed (World Bank, 2014a, 81). South Africa also plans to allow offsets to be
used in lieu of tax payments when its carbon tax goes into effect, currently planned for 2016
(Bosworth, 2014).
Other proposed offset programs also exist. For example, California has negotiated Memoranda of
Understanding with the provinces of Acre, in Brazil, and Chiapas, in Mexico, to work together
to develop a framework to allow the use of offsets from those states in California’s cap-and-trade
system under AB 32.
In addition to the system-level linkages shown in Table 1, some nations’ cap-and-trade systems
participate in an informal, highly indirect form of linkage via the trading of Assigned Amount
Units (AAUs) under the Kyoto Protocol. The Protocol assigns each Annex I Party a quantity of
AAUs equal to its GHG emissions target for a given commitment period, measured in metric tons
of CO2-equivalent. The Protocol then requires each Annex I Party, at the end of a commitment
period, to surrender enough AAUs to cover its actual emissions over the period. If a country’s
emissions exceed its AAUs, it is allowed to make up the difference by purchasing AAUs from
another country under Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol (or by obtaining emissions credits
under one of the Protocol’s project-based mechanisms—Joint Implementation and the CDM)
(UNFCCC, 1998).
In principle, AAU trading between nations creates implicit linkages between their domestic carbon
abatement policies. For example, consider a transfer of AAUs between two nations with cap-andtrade systems, both of which are committed to meeting their Kyoto Protocol commitments. By
buying additional AAUs, the purchasing country would be able to relax the aggregate emissions
cap in its domestic cap-and-trade system while still achieving its Kyoto target. Conversely, after
the transaction, the selling country would need to tighten its emissions cap in order to meet its
Kyoto commitment, holding all else constant.
In practice, the market for AAUs has involved a very limited number of participants. This should
not be a surprise, given that governments are not simple cost-minimizing entities and lack
necessary information about abatement costs (Hahn and Stavins, 1999). Most AAUs have been
purchased by one of three sets of buyers: Japanese firms, the government of Spain, and the World
Bank. Other buyers of AAUs have included Austria, Belgium, Ireland, Japan, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Portugal, and one U.S. firm. Virtually all transactions occurred between 2008 and
2012 and involved sales by economies in transition—specifically, central and eastern European
countries. The sole exception was a very small sale of AAUs by New Zealand in 2010 (UNEP Risø
Centre, 2013; Ranson and Stavins, 2013a, 6).
There have also been a few instances of partial and unconventional linkage, including some
cases of what Burtraw et al. (2013) refer to as “linking by degrees.” Such linkages have occurred
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when jurisdictions have taken actions that fell short of establishing a formal link but nonetheless
brought their systems into closer alignment. For example, in 2013, Australia and California
signed a memorandum of understanding on sharing information and experience with cap-andtrade systems and with linkage (AGCER & CARB, 2013). Similarly, California and RGGI
have engaged in information sharing and have adapted some design elements from each other
(Burtraw et al., 2013), while the state of Washington and the United Kingdom have engaged in a
partnership to collaborate on carbon-market design, as well as other issues (State of Washington
and UK DECC, 2014).
As noted above, linkages among carbon tax systems can be direct or indirect. Carbon taxes are
currently in place or planned in British Columbia, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Ireland, Japan,
Mexico, Norway, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Some
of these taxes, particularly those in Europe, appear intended to complement the carbon price
established by the EU ETS (World Bank, 2014a, 76-87).
The U.S. federal government has recently proposed CO2 regulations on existing electricitygenerating power plants. These regulations would provide strong incentives and renewed interest
in the widespread development of state-level and multi-state market-based policies—in particular,
cap-and-trade systems—over the next several years (Chemnick, 2014). While designed as a set
of state-specific intensity targets (emissions per megawatt-hour), the proposed rule would allow
states to utilize regional cap-and-trade systems, among other approaches, to pursue comparable
mass-based targets. It is likely that some of these regional approaches will link with California’s
AB 32 system and/or the RGGI system.

2.7 Lessons Learned
Experience to date with explicit and implicit linkages of carbon policies across jurisdictions yields
some potentially useful lessons (Ranson and Stavins, 2013a). First of all, a number of regions,
nations, and sub-national jurisdictions have demonstrated their preference for linkage. Despite
evident challenges, the current “bottom-up” trend of bilateral and multilateral linkages has
demonstrated significant progress in the context of a potential future hybrid climate agreement.
Second, linking carbon markets has proved “powerful and effective,” although the risk of linking
includes the reality that problems in one market can be transferred via linkage to other systems
(World Bank, 2014a, 34).
Third, although there was demonstrable value to firms in Annex I countries from their use of
CDM offsets for purposes of cost mitigation, a functioning international market for such offsets
does not appear likely to continue under the current political landscape, particularly given
changes in the EU ETS. Fourth, the International Transaction Log, part of the Kyoto Protocol
process, played an important role by tracking traded units (Marcu, 2014). Fifth, linkages are not
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permanent, and are subject to national or sub-national political swings (as occurred in Australia),
causing uncertainty for regulated firms (Ranson and Stavins, 2013a).15
Finally, the benefits and attraction of linkage are likely to evolve over time. In the short run, the
benefits may be more political (developing a sense of momentum and climate leadership) and
administrative (learning by sharing, reducing duplicative administrative costs, and coordinating
rules and procedures) than economic (this point is also stressed by Burtraw et al. [2013]). In the
short run, full price harmonization is unlikely, given restrictions on the magnitude of allowance
flows observed in current linkage schemes (Table 1). In the absence of full price harmonization,
some efficiency-enhancing transactions will not take place. In the long run, however, as carbon
markets mature and nations adopt more ambitious mitigation targets, especially in light of the
2-degree-Celsius limit on warming that climate negotiators have embraced, it is reasonable to expect
some loosening of constraints on linkage flows, contributing to enhanced price harmonization
and increased cost effectiveness of carbon policy.

3. LINKAGE UNDER A FUTURE INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENT
Given that linkage among homogeneous and heterogeneous policy instruments could be brought
about through bilateral arrangements, is there a useful role for the multilateral UNFCCC to play
in facilitating or regulating linkage in a future climate agreement? To address this question, we
examine potential generic needs for facilitating or regulating linkage, and examine, in particular,
the implications of the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action. On this basis, we explore the
role that linkage might play in a future international climate policy architecture and we identify
design elements that could potentially facilitate linkage.

3.1 Generic Needs for Facilitating and Regulating Linkage
As a first step to identifying needs for international governance in regard to linkage, we examine
situations in which markets for goods and services of various kinds have been subject to coordination
or regulation by national governments and international institutions. We then review rules and
oversight that have been provided for existing regional, national, and sub-national GHG cap-andtrade regimes.

3.1.1 National and International Regulation of Markets for Goods and Services
The regulation of markets can be justified by the presence of market failures. For example, a large
holder of allowances in a cap-and-trade system may be able to exercise market power, thereby
15

In most cases, however, systems were delinked before linkage came into effect (New Jersey’s exit from RGGI being a notable exception).
We thank a reviewer for pointing this out.
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influencing the market price for allowances and erecting barriers to entry, including in the primary
(product) market (Hahn, 1984). While linkage can reduce this impact by enlarging the market,
a single entity might still hold a large share of allowances across the linked jurisdictions. In that
case, market power could remain a concern.
Regulation could, in principle, limit the propagation of risk from one market to another. In
emissions markets, regulation to limit risk could come in the form of price ceilings that trigger the
sale of allowances from a reserve to prevent exceptionally costly emissions reductions from being
required. Conversely, price floors for emissions allowances can be implemented to ensure financial
incentives for a minimal level of emissions reductions.16
More broadly, various forms of governance can help play coordinating roles in markets—reducing
transaction costs and promoting accountability through definitions, standard setting, or increased
transparency. International or cross-jurisdictional institutions can provide several types of support
to help facilitate well-functioning markets. One form of support could involve information
sharing, such as tracking financial instruments and reporting prices and quantities of transactions
to other market participants, thereby reducing information-related transaction costs that might
otherwise constitute barriers to trade.17 A second form of support might focus on developing
universal definitions of key terms, thereby promoting a common language for market exchanges.
Such universal standards for financial instruments or transactions can facilitate well-functioning
markets.
When considering potential market failures, it is important to consider two questions. First,
can the market failure be addressed through private-sector engagement without the need for
intervention by governments or international organizations? And second, would regulation be
welfare improving once politics intrude on the actual design and implementation of regulatory
approaches? When considering options for the 2015 Paris agreement, it will be important to
keep these questions in mind. Our review of existing linkage mechanisms does, however, suggest
the potential for welfare improving regulatory approaches. Even if one takes the position that
some form of top-down regulatory oversight of linkage is not necessary, it will still be important
to ensure that the Paris agreement does not contain elements that would inadvertently impede
linkage and reduce the effectiveness of market-based climate policy mechanisms.

16

Murray, Newell, and Pizer (2009) proposed an allowance reserve as an alternative to price caps and floors. This mechanism requires
a regulatory and governance structure. The EU has also proposed a Market Stability Reserve to address potential market imbalances
(European Commission, 2014d).
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Some information services may best be provided by private firms. In this case, it may be that the regulatory role is to ensure transparency
and open access to market transaction data.
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3.1.2 Rules and Oversight in Existing Regional, National, and Sub-National
Cap-and-Trade Regimes
Oversight mechanisms are in place in several existing cap-and-trade systems, both in the United
States and in Europe. Elements of these existing mechanisms provide insights regarding how
responsibilities may be allocated between the UNFCCC and participating nations.
3.1.2.1 Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative

RGGI is essentially a linked system of separate state-level GHG trading programs. Eight of the
original ten RGGI member states18 established rules and oversight responsibilities through a
2005 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). The MOU established a Regional Organization
with several functions: providing a deliberative forum for member states; developing systems
for tracking emissions and allowances; and providing technical assistance for states to develop
standards, including for the review of offset certification (RGGI, 2005 and 2014a).
The RGGI MOU also prescribes market rules, including setting the initial emissions cap and
establishing the rate of decline of the cap and the quantity of allowances allocated to each member
state, as well as rules governing allowable types of offset projects (including a prohibition on
the use of offsets from outside the United States unless a price trigger is reached, and a rule
that specifies a 2-1 exchange rate for offsets from projects located in U.S. states that are not
RGGI members). RGGI allowance auctions are conducted quarterly through a regional auction
platform, subject to each state’s determination of what portion of its allowance budget to offer
at auction (RGGI, 2014b). Finally, the Regional Organization contracts for Market Monitor
Reports to independently verify the efficiency and competitiveness of the market and to identify
any attempts to manipulate the allowance market (RGGI, 2014d). However, the RGGI MOU is
clear that the Regional Organization is “a technical assistance organization only” and “shall have
no regulatory or enforcement authority with respect to the program…” (RGGI, 2005). Individual
member states retain the lion’s share of oversight and enforcement authority in the RGGI system.
One lesson from the RGGI approach is the important distinction between regulation/enforcement
and technical assistance. The states reserve enforcement authority to themselves, while the
Regional Organization provides important information, coordination, and technical assistance
support at a centralized level. This delineation of functions follows from economic principles,
given the public good nature of information and coordination activities and suggests a similar
potential delineation of responsibilities between the UNFCCC and parties in any oversight of
market mechanisms, including linkage. RGGI illustrates that a technical advisory body can serve
an effective coordinating function and does not require a formal legal instrument.
18

Massachusetts and Rhode Island were not original signatories to the MOU, but signed before the first compliance period began. New
Jersey was an original signatory but withdrew in 2011, leaving RGGI with nine participating states.
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3.1.2.2 California’s AB 32 System and Its Linkage with Quebec

Before linking with the Quebec emissions trading system (Table 1), California autonomously
wrote regulations for its own emissions trading system, established pursuant to AB 32, including:
procedures for running auctions and reporting auction results; rules for trading, including holding
limits and reporting requirements; and timing and prices for cost containment reserve credit sales
(CARB, 2013c).
The 2013 agreement between California and Quebec to link their systems (beginning in 2014)
builds on technical work both governments undertook through their membership in the Western
Climate Initiative and includes plans to resolve several potential barriers to functioning linked
markets (CARB and Quebec, 2013). Specific issues to be resolved include mutually agreed upon
definitions of key terms, combined periodic allowance auctions, a common electronic registry
platform for trading, and entities for facilitating coordination between the parties. The systems’
respective offset protocols continue separately under the agreement, but with the understanding
that any changes to one party’s system will require consultation with the other jurisdiction.
The experience of California and Quebec highlights the need to coordinate multiple elements of
individual programs when linking. It also shows that linkage is made more complicated when it is
executed after program design rather than during initial program design. Of course, this experience
also makes clear that the barriers to linking pre-existing programs are not insurmountable,
though in this case of this linkage the barriers were reduced by California and Quebec’s previous
engagement in the Western Climate Initiative.
3.1.2.3 Financial Regulation of RGGI and California Allowance Markets

Trading of emissions allowance options and futures contracts in the United States is regulated by
the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). The Commission’s broadly defined
mission is to “protect market participants and the public from fraud, manipulation, abusive
practices and systemic risk related to derivatives…and to foster transparent, open, competitive
and financially sound markets” (CFTC, 2014). The International Commodity Exchange recently
submitted amendments to the U.S. CFTC’s exchange rules providing for the trading of options
contracts in both the RGGI (2015 and 2016) and California (2017 and 2018) allowance markets
(ICE Futures, 2014).
The CFTC’s mission to foster transparency in markets indicates the importance of institutions
to support the smooth functioning of financial markets and dovetails with a decision of COP19 in Warsaw in November 2013, which requested the UNFCCC’s Ad Hoc Working Group
on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP) to identify the information that parties
should put forward to facilitate the “clarity, transparency and understanding” of each party’s
intended nationally determined contribution (UNFCCC, 2014, Decision 1/CP.19 2(b) and (c)).
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As discussed in section 3.3.2, oversight related to standards of transparency in reporting emissions
data and cross border flows of permits of the type provided by the CFTC could be provided by
the UNFCCC or by other organizations that have the technical expertise in place to provide that
oversight.
3.1.2.4 European Union Emissions Trading System

The European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) provides a more centralized model
of linked trading systems than the examples that currently exist in North America.19 Emissions
monitoring and verification is governed by European Commission guidelines, rather than by
plans adopted by member countries (European Commission, 2014a). Following an EU directive
change in 2009, allowance tracking is centralized under a single registry, which records lists of
covered entities in each country, allocations received, and verified emissions; accounts of all parties
holding allowances; transfers of allowances between account holders; and annual reconciliation
between allowances and verified emissions (European Commission, 2014b).
The European Commission is in the process of revising its financial-markets rules, and as part of
this process has proposed including emissions allowances as fully regulated financial instruments
(European Commission 2014e).20 This would make ETS allowance markets subject to safeguards
and monitoring aimed at preventing market manipulation, increasing market transparency in
terms of allowance prices and quantity of allowance transactions, and imposing checks on buyers
and sellers to prevent money-laundering. The EU’s experience addressing issues of tax fraud and
cybersecurity will be extremely valuable for any monitoring or regulatory role the UNFCCC or
other designated entities might play in overseeing linked carbon markets in the post-2020 period.

3.1.3 International Coordination of National Policies for Regulating Markets
In finance and trade, existing international institutions demonstrate how information-sharing,
standard-setting, and model policies can facilitate the harmonization of national policies that
regulate markets for various goods and services. The UNFCC or another international institution
could likewise facilitate linkage by providing a forum for setting standards, exchanging information,
and developing model policies or rules.
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The governance structure of the EU-ETS has evolved over time, from a structure that was highly decentralized in the beginning to one
that is increasingly centralized. For a description of the early organization of the ETS, see Kruger et al., (2007).
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This also marks a transition from national financial regulation towards more centralized EU regulation. In the UK, where most emissions
trading to date has occurred, the Financial Services Authority regulated futures and options, but oversight of futures trading has shifted
to the UK’s Financial Conduct Authority.
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3.1.3.1 Coordination of Financial Regulation

Internationally, a number of financial institutions facilitate market operation through information
sharing, coordination of laws and regulation, cooperation on enforcement issues, and peer review.
These may provide lessons for linkage and for carbon markets more generally.
The Basel Committee, which consists of representatives from 27 central banks and banking
regulators, aims to enhance global financial stability by improving the quality of banking
supervision worldwide. The Committee is best known for a series of capital adequacy accords, which
have influenced national regulators significantly, even though they are not legally-binding (Scott
and Gelpern, 2012; BIS, 2013). The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), with representatives
from 34 countries, combats money laundering and terrorist financing by developing minimum
standards for laws and regulations, by monitoring the implementation of such standards through
a peer-review process, and by imposing sanctions on non-complying countries, for example, by
prohibiting financial transactions with institutions in non-complying countries (Brummer, 2011).
The International Organization of Securities Commissions, whose members are regulatory
agencies that cover more than 95 percent of the world’s securities markets, develops and promotes
standards for securities regulation, cooperation on enforcement, and information exchange
(IOSCO, 2014). The Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP), which is jointly implemented
by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, conducts analyses of countries’
financial sectors (IMF, 2014a). FSAP was originally a voluntary program for countries to assess and
demonstrate the health of their financial systems. After the financial crisis of 2008-09, however,
the IMF identified 25 nations with “systemically important financial sectors” that must submit
analyses to FSAP at least once every five years (IMF, 2014b). Assessments remain voluntary for
other jurisdictions.
The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) acts as a bank for national central banks. It
offers a range of financial services to central banks and other official monetary institutions for
maintaining monetary and financial stability. The Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems,
headquartered at BIS, engages in standard-setting activities for payment and settlement systems,
and monitors new developments in cross-jurisdictional settlement systems (BIS, 2014a,b).
The UNFCCC, an organization designated by the UNFCCC, or another organization formed by
countries interested in linkage and carbon markets more generally might learn from some of these
examples in designing measurement, reporting, and verification systems, as well as in developing
default or model rules (discussed further below). The UNFCCC, however, will need to be cautious
in not taking on oversight roles for which it does not have the technical expertise. Given the
complexity of modern international markets, it will be important for national governments and
the UNFCCC to work closely with organizations that have strong expertise in market functioning
and coordination.
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3.1.3.2 International Harmonization of Standards and Rules to Promote Trade

Several international institutions facilitate international trade, the most prominent among them
being the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT). WTO members receive Most-Favored Nation (MFN) status and national treatment (the
equal treatment of imported and locally-produced goods), among other benefits, when engaging
in trade with each other (WTO, 2014a). In exchange, members must commit to meet specific
requirements with respect to the transparency of trade policies and periodic scrutiny of policy
implementation (WTO, 2014b).
Trade in services can be obstructed by the prospect of double taxation, where an entity providing
a service across international borders might be taxed both where the income was earned and
where the entity is based. There are no general international rules governing the proper method of
taxing such income, and thus bilateral agreements between nations are necessary to overcome this
barrier. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) established a
Model Tax Convention for nations interested in adopting bilateral treaties on taxation, which has
served as the basis for more than 225 bilateral tax treaties (OECD, 2014). The concept of model
rules is one that we discuss further in a later section and one that the Paris agreement could play
a role in facilitating.
3.1.3.3 Other Coordination of National Policies

In addition to international efforts to harmonize rules for trade and financial transactions, there
are other cases of international organizations that facilitate the harmonization of national policies.
One example is the World Health Organization (WHO). WHO’s mission includes developing
and promoting public health standards, as well as monitoring global health trends that are beyond
the scope and capacity of national governments (WHO, 2014a). WHO also develops and enforces
“International Health Regulations,” legally binding for WHO’s member nations, which stipulate
conditions under which nations must report public health outbreaks that may have consequences
for other countries (World Health Organization, 2014b). Again, there could be much value in
sharing experiences and lessons about the harmonization of national policies in discussions with
groups such as the WHO to develop best practices to facilitate linkage in the Paris agreement.

3.2 Linkage as Part of Climate Policy Architecture
Existing and planned links among regional, national, and sub-national climate change policies
provide preliminary evidence regarding both the near-term and long-term roles that linkage may
play in a global climate policy architecture.
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3.2.1 Near-Term Role for Linkage
Since the 1997 Kyoto Protocol entered into force, a patchwork system of linkages has evolved
among independent regional, national, and sub-national climate policies. This patchwork of
existing and planned links hints at the outline of a near-term “system” that would combine
several regional, directly linked cap-and-trade systems, with some level of indirect connection via
a common credit system, such as the CDM or a sectoral crediting program.
Although linkage can help with market functioning, the near-term cost savings from direct links
between cap-and-trade systems may be modest. Because two-way links are currently planned
primarily between systems in developed nations, they may not be able to help regulated firms
take advantage of very low-cost abatement opportunities (such as those available in developing
countries). Furthermore, direct linkages suffer from a climate policy irony: the links that are
most attractive for economic reasons—i.e., those between systems with very different allowance
prices (such as RGGI and the EU ETS)—may be politically the most difficult to establish because
of concerns (real or perceived) about the large international capital flows that such links might
generate.21
Links with a credit system can also contribute to the near-term goals of cost-minimization and
market liquidity. In principle, a near-term set of indirect links could yield much of the cost
savings and other advantages of a broad set of direct links, while also preserving a high level of
national control over domestic carbon markets. This would allow countries to tailor policies to fit
their specific political and economic circumstances.
In practice, the ability of credit systems—in particular, the CDM—to create meaningful indirect
links between cap-and-trade systems has been mixed. Despite the potential cost-savings from
linking to a credit system, some jurisdictions that have implemented cap-and-trade programs
(such as California and Quebec) have chosen to allow only selected credits generated from outside
projects. Others have imposed quantity limits on the use of external credits, have designed
application procedures that make it difficult to receive approval for new offset projects, or have
implemented trigger mechanisms that allow the use of foreign offsets only if domestic allowance
prices exceed some pre-determined level.
This general reluctance to allow links with credit systems (in particular, with the CDM) is
motivated by concerns about additionality (that is, the concern that credit systems like the CDM
allow firms to claim emission reductions that would have happened anyway) and a desire to
emphasize domestic reductions. Politically, as we discuss elsewhere, domestic reductions appear
21

However, the inclusion of international offsets in the Waxman-Markey cap-and-trade bill that passed the U.S. House of Representatives
in 2009 was viewed as a critical element of the U.S. contribution to the commitment by developed countries in the Copenhagen Accord
to mobilize $100 billion annually by 2020 for mitigation, adaptation, and other climate-change-related activities in developing countries.
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to be preferred to offsets (controlling for cost). But if the goal is to maximize emission reductions
at minimum cost, offset limits are not desirable so long as the environmental integrity of offsets
can be assured. Practically speaking, it may be difficult to provide that assurance, in which case
limits are applied.

3.2.2 Linkage as a Foundation for a Future International Climate Policy
Architecture
By helping to build an institutional framework of coordination among different GHG mitigation
systems, linkage could help create a pathway to a more robust long-term international climate
policy architecture. In the short term, there will probably be several regional sets of directly
linked systems, with some indirect linkage through the CDM or other offset/sectoral crediting
programs. This short-term arrangement may transition toward a system with a greater number of
direct links. In the same way that the GATT transitioned into the WTO, a bottom-up system of
links between national-level climate programs could, in principle, provide the basic institutional
framework for a broader agreement (Stewart and Wiener, 2003; Ranson and Stavins, 2013b).22
Linkage could help support a future climate agreement in another way: by providing incentives
for nations to adopt market-based climate policies. Major developed countries with cap-andtrade systems may be expected to attempt to use offset programs as both a carrot and a stick to
stimulate mitigation action in counties without an emissions cap. The best example of this may
be the EU ETS policy toward CDM offsets from developing countries. Whereas the EU ETS
allowed regulated entities to use CDM credits originating in any developing country between
2008 and 2012, beginning in 2013 new CDM credits are only allowed for projects originating
in “Least Developed Countries” (the 48 poorest countries, as defined by the United Nations),
thus excluding projects in China and India, among other countries (European Commission,
2011b). This policy shift is deliberate; according to EU documents: “[w]hile initially the use of
international credits was allowed for cost-effective compliance, this has been complemented with
the objective of actively using the leverage the EU possesses as the by far most important source
of demand for international credits” (European Commission, 2011b, 1).
Finally, linkage could support a future climate agreement in the short run by facilitating learning
and sharing of ideas about how to implement market based mechanisms, by reducing the
administrative costs of meeting nationally determined contributions, and by contributing to a
sense of momentum that helps build political support at the national level.
22

On the other hand, linkage could also create political and regulatory obstacles to a future agreement. Linking two cap-and-trade systems
requires agreement about a variety of design characteristics, including the stringency of the cap in each system. To the extent that
linkage makes it difficult for countries to change such design characteristics, it might also become more difficult for countries to make
the adjustments necessary to support some future climate agreement. Whether this outweighs the political momentum that linkage can
provide is an empirical question.

HARVARD PROJECT ON CLIMATE AGREEMENTS • HARVARD KENNEDY SCHOOL » 23

3.3 Implications of the UNFCCC’s Durban Platform for Linkage
It is anticipated that a new international climate agreement will be finalized in December 2015,
in Paris, pursuant to the 2011 Durban Platform for Enhanced Action. A number of important
issues related to the role of markets and linkage remain to be worked out in the Paris agreement.

3.3.1 Durban Platform Approach
The Durban Platform for Enhanced Action calls for Parties to the UNFCCC to “…develop a
protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention.”
The new agreement is to be adopted at COP-21, in 2015, and will apply from 2020. In contrast to
the negotiating mandate for the Kyoto Protocol, which specifically excluded any new commitments
for non-Annex I Parties, the Durban Platform is open-ended and specifies that the new agreement
will be “applicable to all Parties” (UNFCCC, 2012).
Marcu (2014) has identified three possible scenarios for how carbon markets could evolve
under the Paris agreement. One scenario involves a true global carbon market with a centralized
regulatory authority to oversee market operation. No one—including Marcu—expects this sort
of “super KP” outcome in Paris. Marcu’s second scenario is dubbed the “Cartesian” scenario. In
this scenario, regional, national, or sub-national carbon-pricing schemes are developed, with the
UNFCCC playing a role as certifier of emission reductions for purposes of meeting international
obligations. As exists in current linked cap-and-trade systems, domestic factors may limit the
amount of trading that occurs between jurisdictions. The UNFCCC would play an oversight role,
determining whether an emission reduction can be counted under the international agreement.
Marcu’s third scenario is termed “Globally Networked Carbon Markets” and is based in part on
the aforementioned World Bank’s (2014b) Globally Networked Carbon Markets Initiative. As
in the second scenario, it envisions a patchwork of regional, national, and sub-national carbon
reduction systems. Unlike the second scenario, however, an independent assessment and rating
service (rather than the UNFCCC) would assess the value of emission reduction units. An
International Carbon Reserve would serve to maintain liquidity in global trading by buying,
selling, banking, and borrowing carbon reduction assets. An essential difference from the second
scenario is the delegation of oversight and market facilitation authority to third parties with
expertise in these sorts of functions.23
Regardless which vision of global carbon markets emerges, linkage will play an important role.
How linkage is operationalized depends on the global carbon market approach that evolves and
the role of centralized authorities, whether it be the UNFCCC or some other institution(s).
23

Discussions in Paris on the Framework for Various Approaches (FVA) that was initiated in Durban in 2011 may provide an organizing
structure for some of these issues. See Marcu (2012) and IETA (2013).
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Hints at the form of the future global system may be seen in the ongoing and evolving international
negotiations. Over the past several years, these negotiations have gravitated toward a structure for
the 2015 agreement that will feature a hybrid policy architecture, namely one that combines topdown elements, such as for monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV), with a bottom-up
set of contributions (“nationally determined contributions” or NDCs), consisting of emissions
limitation targets and/or actions specified by individual countries, presumably on the basis of what
they judge to be feasible domestically (Höhne, Ellermann, and Li, 2014). As of June, 2014, no
parameters had been adopted regarding what countries can offer as contributions (Bodansky and
Diringer, 2014); one can expect a mix of market-based mechanisms and non-market regulatory
approaches, along with absolute emissions targets as well as emissions-intensity targets.
While COP-19 in Warsaw (November 2013) began to develop the broad outlines of this hybrid
architecture, the exact shape of the Paris agreement is unknown and could evolve in a number
of ways (Bodansky and Diringer, 2014). It is worth reviewing various elements that might be
included, because the necessary elements of a 2015 agreement to facilitate linkage depend critically
on the ultimate design of the overall agreement.
For example, the 2015 agreement may articulate a quantitative, long-term goal to make more
concrete the Convention’s ultimate objective to stabilize “greenhouse gas concentrations in the
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate
system” (UNFCCC, 1992, Article 2). At COP-16 in Cancun, the Parties to the UNFCCC
adopted a goal of limiting global average warming to less than 2 degrees Celsius from pre-industrial
levels. The 2015 agreement could further elaborate the UNFCCC’s objective—for example, by
articulating a cumulative or medium-term emissions goal. Such a quantitative emissions goal,
Bodansky and Diringer (2014) argue, would make it easier to assess the ambition of individual
countries’ NDCs and their sufficiency in helping achieve the goal.
Identifying cost effectiveness as an element of the long-term goal could provide reassurance that the
costs of meeting the goal are not being ignored; it would also remind negotiators of the important
role that market-based mechanisms and linkage can play in contributing to economically efficient
environmental outcomes. A long-term goal for linkage in a global system might be full price
harmonization across country and regional mitigation systems. A short- to medium-term goal
might be to limit price differences to bands around some central price—which itself would be
expected to rise in conjunction with any quantitative goals on mitigation.
A second key element of the 2015 agreement concerns the formulation, presentation, and
inscription of national mitigation contributions (Bodansky and Diringer, 2014). This element
involves many issues, including the legal character of NDCs (whether, for example, each country
would commit to achieving its NDC), the content of the NDCs (for example, specificity and
scope), the time frame of NDCs, accounting rules, participatory and information requirements
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(issues of transparency), and ex ante review. As Marcu (2014) notes, the sooner details are resolved
over the shape of the 2015 agreement and how countries intend to implement their NDCs, the
sooner markets can begin to develop and function.
A third element is the process for revising NDCs. Revisions might be left to the discretion of
individual parties, they might require collective agreement among all parties, or something in
between. How this plays out will have implications for market mechanisms and linked systems.
A fourth element is the degree of transparency and accountability in implementing NDCs.
This set of issues parallels existing efforts under the Kyoto Protocol to review compliance with
Kyoto emission targets, as well as MRV requirements negotiated in the Cancun Agreements.
Transparency and accountability are critical to the success of linkage mechanisms.
Finally, there is the issue of whether and how subsequent rounds of NDCs will be negotiated
(Bodansky and Diringer, 2014). The design of linked market-based mechanisms will need to
take into account the time frame and level of uncertainty about out-year commitments when
addressing such issues as banking and borrowing, sunset provisions for linkage agreements, and
other dynamic market-related design issues.

3.3.2 Long-Term Role for Linkage under the Durban Platform
A set of unilateral emissions-limitation contributions that is part of a hybrid policy architecture
under the 2015 agreement, combined with a decentralized set of links, could result in a more costeffective outcome (Jaffe, Ranson, and Stavins, 2010). The near-term outlines of this approach may
already be emerging, with regional trading partners choosing to link directly with each other, with
broader indirect linkages via the CDM or through new sectoral crediting mechanisms. As more
jurisdictions establish cap-and-trade and other systems, this fragmented near-term system could
evolve into a broader bottom-up architecture that includes a set of direct linkages.
Whether such a decentralized architecture actually achieves meaningful environmental results in
a cost-effective manner depends on several factors. A sufficient number of large emitter countries
(industrialized and developing) would have to agree to participate and commit to substantial
unilateral emissions reductions. In the case of industrialized countries, commitments would need to
be self-motivated—in part driven by internal politics. In some developing countries, and especially
in the least developed countries, commitments would likely depend on incentives provided by
developed countries. Such incentives could be positive—for example, developed countries could
offer financial support for climate abatement policies and the opportunity to sell allowances or
offset credits. Developed countries could also create negative incentives for participation, for
example by imposing carbon-border-tax adjustments as a condition for the opportunity to sell
offset credits. For this type of international policy architecture to be cost-effective would require
links among GHG trading systems in industrialized and developing countries.
26 « FACILITATING LINKAGE OF HETEROGENEOUS REGIONAL, NATIONAL, AND SUB-NATIONAL CLIMATE POLICIES THROUGH A FUTURE INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT

3.3.3 A Role for the 2015 Agreement to Facilitate Linkage
It will likely be left to the top-down (or centralized, UNFCCC-based) components of the
2015 agreement to provide mechanisms—and institutions—to compare contributions and
verify performance, in part to measure progress toward global goals. In addition, preliminary
international discussions and negotiations to facilitate the use of markets to enhance the cost
effectiveness of approaches to reduce emissions have already commenced under the UNFCCC in
the form of the FVA.
The FVA can consist of a set of components and rules designed to increase the likelihood that the
various national approaches used for mitigation meet some set of common standards, especially in
terms of environmental integrity (Carbon Market Forum, 2012) and accounting rules. The FVA
would thereby focus on mitigation actions that produce reductions (units) used for compliance
with international obligations by a jurisdiction other than the one where they were created or
issued. Such actions can be market or non-market based. In other words, the FVA could facilitate
linkage of heterogeneous national climate policies under the 2015 Agreement.
Key objectives of the FVA might include helping to ensure that internationally traded units
used for compliance under the Paris agreement are reported, reviewed, and tracked to avoid
double-counting. FVA rules and standards might be informed by, or build upon, Kyoto Protocol
flexible-mechanism resources, such as the International Transaction Log, and on the resources of
jurisdictions with existing market systems, such as the European Union’s central registry (Marcu,
2014).
It is clear that, under the umbrella of the FVA, UNFCCC Parties and observers are considering
how emissions reductions under a 2015 agreement, including reductions achieved with nonmarket mechanisms, can be transferred between and among governments—that is, to a close
approximation, how such mitigation-reduction systems might be linked. Parties and observers are
also considering how the FVA could be used to link existing or future market-based mechanisms
that provide for emissions trading between private parties.

3.4 Potential Design Elements in an International Agreement to Facilitate
Linkage
Specific elements of a future international policy architecture under the 2015 agreement could
help facilitate the growth and operation of a robust system of international linkages between
regional, national, and sub-national policies. On the other hand, other potential elements of a
new agreement could get in the way of effective, bottom-up linkage.
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3.4.1 Elements That Would Inhibit Effective Linkage
One design element that would have the effect of inhibiting international linkage would be overly
prescriptive or restrictive rules on allowable trading across linked systems. A clear example would
be a requirement (or even a preference) for domestic actions to achieve national commitments.
Such a “supplementarity principle” can render cross-border linkage difficult or impossible, and
thereby drive up compliance costs, decrease international ambition, and reduce the feasibility of
reaching an agreement.
For example, several provisions of the Kyoto Protocol suggest that internal emissions abatement
should take precedence over compliance through the Protocol’s flexibility mechanisms
(International Emissions Trading, Joint Implementation, and the CDM),24 but the precise
meaning of this principle of supplementarity has been debated since the adoption of the Protocol.
Also, as noted previously, limits on the use of foreign offsets for compliance are common in
existing regional, national, and sub-national cap-and-trade systems.
A second (and related) issue is the confusion that can arise from competing and conflicting
objectives and rules between the UNFCCC and regional or national trading systems. An example
is the controversy over CDM credits issued for projects that target industrial gases such as HFC23 and nitrous oxide (N2O) from adipic acid production. Responding to concerns that access to
CDM credits was creating perverse incentives to continue or even increase production of these
gases, the EU ETS disallowed the use of CDM credits from industrial gas projects for purposes
of ETS compliance after 2012 (European Commission, 2011a). The CDM Executive Board,
however, continued to issue credits for these projects (albeit with greater restrictions on their use).
The controversy sowed confusion and damaged perceptions of carbon trading in general (Marcu,
2014).
The potential for conflicting rules relates to a broader issue about how national or regional
carbon mitigation systems become recognized as valid for purposes of meeting international
commitments under the Paris agreement. Marcu (2014) notes two possible approaches (approval
and transparency) by which reductions under domestic systems might become eligible for
counting in the UNFCCC context. The former approach would require explicit COP approval of
domestic systems, while the latter would involve the development of model rules through COP
negotiations. Domestic systems would then demonstrate how they conform to internationally
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Article 6.1 of the Kyoto Protocol states that: “The acquisition of emission reduction units [through trading] shall be supplemental to
domestic actions for the purposes of meeting commitments under Article 3.” Likewise, Article 17 states that: “Any such trading shall
be supplemental to domestic actions for the purpose of meeting quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments under that
article.” Article 12.3.b states that: “Parties included in Annex I may use the certified emission reductions accruing from such project
activities [under the Clean Development Mechanism] to contribute to compliance with part of their quantified emission limitation and
reduction commitments under Article 3 …” (UNFCCC, 1998).
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agreed templates. The latter approach could be combined with a peer review process but would
not require explicit COP approval.25
A third area of potential concern stems from a lack of clarity (or confusion) over objectives. For
example, adding a “sustainable development condition” to CDM projects can create confusion
in markets (Marcu 2014). This in turn undermines trading across systems, an essential role of
linkage.
Finally, rules that restrict which countries can link (for example, allowing linkage only among
Annex I countries), or that make it difficult for countries to join the category of countries that can
link, would inhibit effective linkage.

3.4.2 Elements That Could Facilitate Effective Linkage
If linkage is to play a significant role in executing a hybrid international policy architecture, then
several categories of design elements merit consideration for inclusion in the Paris agreement,
either directly or by establishing a process for subsequent international negotiations. These
elements include: definition of compliance units; registries and tracking; monitoring, verification,
and reporting of individual trades; interaction with cost-containment instruments; and oversight
and monitoring of the market in aggregate.
Effective linkage requires common definitions of key terms, particularly with respect to the
units that are used for compliance purposes. This will be especially important for links between
heterogeneous systems, such as between a carbon tax and a cap-and-trade system. A model rule
for linkage could be particularly helpful in this area.26
Registries and tracking are necessary with linked systems, whether the links bring together a
homogeneous or heterogeneous set of policies.27 Indeed, a key role for the top-down part of a
hybrid architecture that allows for international linkage of national policy instruments will be
tracking, reporting, and recording allowance unit transactions. A centralized institution could
maintain the accounts of parties that hold allowances, record transfers of allowances between
25

Variations on these two approaches could build on the flexibility mechanisms described in Bodansky and Diringer (2014). These include
offering alternatives under which different states may operate to comply with overarching rules, offering default and opt-out clauses,
offering opt-in procedures, providing contextual standards to provide flexibility where needed, and using guidelines that serve to set
expectations (but not requirements) for behavior and mechanism design.
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In regard to market coverage, even a (homogeneous) set of national cap-and-trade systems will differ in many design elements, but not
all of these elements will require coordination or harmonization. For example, systems may differ in their scope—that is, in the sectors of
their respective economies that are included under an emissions cap—but this difference need not create a barrier to linkage and trading.
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This could be particularly important to avoid double counting in overlapping jurisdictions.
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account holders, and annually reconcile allowances and verified emissions. This is particularly
important because of the likely omission of AAUs from the post 2020 regime (Marcu, 2014).
Some form of international compliance unit would contribute to more effective and efficient
registry operation and would help avoid double-counting problems.
International compliance units would make the functioning of an international transaction log
more straightforward and reduce the administrative burden of reconciling international registries
with national registries (Marcu, 2014).28 There is also a possible role for the UNFCCC to provide
centralized registry services for countries that lack the capacity to develop national registries on
their own (Marcu 2014). Finally, there may be economies of scale in regionalizing registries for
certain developing countries under the auspices of the UNFCCC or some other multilateral
institution (for example, the World Bank or a regional development bank).
More broadly, any system, with or without linkage, will require monitoring, verification, and
reporting of emissions. Likewise, compliance and enforcement mechanisms are of generic need in
any effective agreement.
The interaction of linked systems with cost-containment elements (banking, borrowing, offsets,
and price-stabilization mechanisms) raises particular issues in the context of linkage, because
in some cases these mechanisms automatically propagate from one linked system to another.
Common rules for approving and measuring offsets may be important, and—more broadly—a
tiered system of offset categories could be helpful, with jurisdictions choosing their own “exchange
rates” for each category.
Finally, market oversight and monitoring, together with various safeguards against market
manipulation such as by large holders of allowances who may be able to exercise market power,
may increase confidence in the system. In some cases, national and international institutions may
already exist, or need only relatively minor additional capacity, to provide these functions.

4. FROM THE CONCEPTUAL TO THE CONCRETE:
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND LINKAGE
4.1 Possible Functions of the UNFCCC Regime with Respect to Linkage
The 2015 Paris agreement could play at least four different roles with respect to linkage of
heterogeneous policy instruments. First, it could discourage linkage, either by not allowing
countries to count international transfers toward their mitigation contributions, or by limiting
28

Prag et al. (2013) argue that mandating a standard type of international compliance unit type may not improve accountability and
could add complexity as domestic mitigation schemes evolve over time. While their argument is framed specifically in the context of
international units as a feature of the FVA, they make the useful general point that what is especially important is that standards underlie
the creation of any units that are designed to comply with commitments made under the Paris agreement.
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the number or types of transferred units that can be counted for compliance purposes. Second,
the agreement could be silent on the topic of linkage, creating legal and regulatory uncertainty
about whether international transfers are allowed. Third, it could expressly authorize linkage
but not provide any further details about how linkage should occur, leaving it up either to
future UNFCCC negotiating sessions to work out the details or to national governments to
develop bilateral or multilateral linkage arrangements. Finally, the Paris agreement could establish
institutional arrangements and rules that facilitate and promote linkage.
In pursuing this last role—namely, facilitating and promoting linkage—the UNFCCC regime
could serve three related functions. First, it could provide an international infrastructure for
linkage—for example, an international system for MRV, an international transaction log to register
transfers between national systems and prevent double counting, and an international compliance
mechanism. Second, it could play a regulatory function, for example by establishing minimum
standards to ensure that linkage arrangements do not undermine the environmental integrity of
international and domestic climate change efforts or by requiring international certification for
linkage arrangements that will be used for international compliance. Third, the UNFCCC could
also play a coordinating function, providing harmonized or model rules for national trading
systems and/or international linkages in order to reduce the transaction costs of linkage.

4.2 Key Variables
Rules relating to linkage could be formulated in many different ways in the 2015 outcome. They
could be mandatory or optional; uniform or harmonized; and formalized in a legally binding,
hard-law instrument, such as a treaty, or in a non-binding instrument, such as a COP decision,
model rule, or guidelines.
International trade and finance instruments, such as those outlined in section 3.1, provide
illustrations of these different options, as well as insights into how GHG linkage could be
governed. Presently, a wide range of different types of agreements and organizations govern
international trade and finance. An analysis of these approaches shows how different governance
functions relating to linkage can be legally implemented, demonstrates that different governance
approaches are preferred for different objectives, and suggests that some types of legal instruments
are better suited to implementing a particular governance function.

4.2.1 Mandatory vs. Optional
Rules for multilateral linkage in the 2015 outcome could be mandatory or optional. International
instruments relating to finance and trade provide illustrations of these different options. The
GATT, for example, sets mandatory rules limiting barriers to trade such as quotas. In contrast, the
Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG) sets default rules, which parties are free
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to depart from in negotiating sales contracts. The OECD Model Tax Convention (OECDMTC)
is even less directive than the CISG—it merely serves as a template that nations can choose to use
as a starting point for bilateral negotiations.
In general, mandatory rules are appropriate to address “cooperation” problems, where each nation
has an incentive to cooperate only if it has an assurance that other nations will reciprocate.
In contrast, optional rules—such as the CISG or OECDMTC rules—are useful in addressing
“coordination” problems, where harmonized rules help to lower transaction costs.
The 2015 outcome could include a mixture of mandatory and optional elements. For example,
it could commit parties undertaking linkage to a system of international tracking and review,
but leave issues related to market coverage, cost containment, and treatment of new emitters
and emitter closures to be addressed through informal coordination among national regulators
or through the development of a model rule or guidelines by the COP, the Subsidiary Body for
Implementation (SBI), or a non-UNFCCC institution.

4.2.2 Uniform vs. Harmonized
Multilateral linkage rules could provide for greater or less uniformity among national policies or
linkage arrangements. Some international instruments specify highly detailed rules, which produce
uniform results. The Kyoto Protocol and Marrakesh Accords, for example, prescribe precise
rules to track and account for transfers of compliance units between parties. Other instruments
prescribe more general standards, which harmonize national approaches (i.e., ensure some level
of similarity), but give parties flexibility to take into account their particular circumstances. The
IPCC inventory guidelines, for example, provide methodologies for estimating GHG emissions,
but allow nations to choose among different tiers, so that officials can use methods appropriate for
their resources and can focus on those emissions that are most significant to their national totals
(IPCC, 2006).
Uniformity and harmonization each have their advantages. Uniformity reduces transaction
costs and creates greater policy certainty. But harmonization allows nations to take into account
their particular circumstances and values, and therefore tends to be easier to achieve. Moreover,
harmonization leaves some room for nations to experiment and may thus promote more dynamic
systems that have a greater capacity to evolve over time.
From the perspective of market participants, international carbon trading would be easiest if
every nation adopted the same linkage rules, so that trade between any two countries occurred in
exactly the same way. However, this level of uniformity is unlikely to be achieved in the near term
(if ever), and is unnecessary for linkage to be widely adopted. While some elements of linkage may
require uniform rules, most can be addressed by harmonized rules—in other words, rules that are
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similar but not identical. For example, uniform rules may be needed to define the units of trade
and to track units to avoid double counting internationally (Tuerk, et al., 2009). But procedures
for MRV and crediting may require only broad adherence to minimum standards, to ensure that
emission reductions actually occur, while leaving countries free to adopt more stringent rules that
limit the use of emissions credits.
Importantly, some issues relevant to linkage can be addressed through local, non-harmonized
rules. For example, national cap-and-trade systems could adopt different allocation methods and
yet still be effectively linked. Insisting on uniform rules for all elements of linkage in the 2015
outcome would thus be unnecessary and counter-productive. It would not yield more linkage
activity, and it would delay the adoption of international legal instruments to facilitate linkage.
A mixture of more and less uniform rules, providing for a spectrum of harmonization, is best for
facilitating linkage.

4.2.3 Hard vs. Soft
Multilateral linkage rules could be contained in international instruments that are either “hard”
or “soft” (Shelton, 2003). Treaties such as the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol, the GATT, and
the CISG represent hard law, and are legally-binding as a matter of international law. In contrast,
political agreements, guidelines, model rules, and recommendations serve a prescriptive function
but are not legal instruments—hence they represent soft law.
Because hard legal instruments provide a stronger signal of commitment than soft-law instruments
and are potentially applicable directly in domestic courts, they are useful for addressing issues
where reciprocity or domestic enforcement is important (Tuerk et al., 2009). Hard-law instruments
provide greater certainty, but are generally more difficult to negotiate and revise. For example, the
WTO Uruguay Round agreements took eight years to negotiate, and the Doha Round of revisions
to the WTO is still underway after thirteen years.
In contrast, soft-law instruments are typically easier to adopt and amend, thus making them
useful for addressing issues in their early phases, when there may not be sufficient political will to
adopt a treaty or when it may be necessary to revise the rules on a regular basis in response to new
information and circumstances. The Basel Capital Accords, for example, were quickly revised in
response to the 2008 financial crisis, with Basel III being adopted in 2010.
A number of soft law standards have already been adopted to harmonize national climate mitigation
systems, outside of the UNFCCC. For example, the International Standards Organization (ISO)
has promulgated standards for monitoring and reporting GHG emissions and emissions reductions
at the organization and project level (ISO, 2009a; ISO, 2009b; ISO, 2013a); ISO standards also
exist for validating or verifying GHG reduction claims (ISO, 2009c; ISO, 2011; ISO, 2013b).
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A mixture of hard- and soft-law instruments might be best suited to facilitate linkage. Core
elements might be contained in a hard-law instrument that is comparatively difficult to amend.
A provision in a hard-law instrument that mitigation-unit transfers can count towards a party’s
emission-reduction contribution would likely be required for wide-scale linkage to occur.29 A
hard-law instrument might also include model rules defining the units to be used for linkage,
as well as a requirement that parties allow international tracking of units in order to engage in
linkage.
Other elements of linkage, however, could potentially be addressed in soft-law instruments or
through informal coordination among national regulators. Either of these approaches would
allow for greater flexibility to make changes in the future. For example, minimum standards for
national and international MRV, registries, and crediting mechanisms might be set forth in softlaw instruments. Although soft-law instruments are not legally binding, compliance could be
assured by making compliance a condition of linkage, just as national governments have required
compliance with the FATF and Basel Committee standards as a condition for granting access to
their domestic financial markets.

4.2.4 Relationships among variables
Mandatoriness, uniformity, and legal form are independent variables; they need not co-vary. The
capital adequacy requirements in the Basel Accords are phrased in mandatory rather than optional
terms, even though the various Basel Accords are soft-law instruments. Similarly, ISO standards
may be very precise, even though they are not legally binding. Conversely, the CISG is a legal
agreement, and hence qualifies as hard law, even though it sets forth non-mandatory, default rules
from which parties may deviate.
Nevertheless, mandatoriness, uniformity, and legal form are related in that they all tend to increase
the capacity of a rule to constrain behavior. Thus, rules that address systemic risks or collective
action problems are ideally formulated in precise, mandatory, and legally binding terms, all else
being equal. In contrast, rules intended to address coordination problems may be optional and
soft.

4.3 Linkage in the International Climate Change Regime to Date
From the outset, the UN climate change regime has recognized the potential role of linkage
in promoting cost-effective emissions mitigation. Indeed, rules adopted to date as part of that
regime illustrate many of the options for addressing linkage in the 2015 agreement.
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Such an agreement could be conditioned on both linked systems adopting international minimum standards, as discussed below.
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4.3.1 UNFCCC
The UNFCCC provides the seed for international linkages by allowing developed countries to
implement mitigation policies “jointly with other Parties” (UNFCCC, 1992, Article 4.2(a)).
Although countries might decide to link their mitigation policies even in the absence of a
multilateral climate change regime like the UNFCCC (for the reasons discussed in sections 2.3
and 2.5), Article 4.2(a) provides an incentive for linkage by implicitly authorizing parties to use
transferred units for international compliance purposes.
The history of the Activities Implemented Jointly (AIJ) mechanism under the UNFCCC (not
to be confused with Joint Implementation under the Kyoto Protocol), however, illustrates the
potential for undermining agreement on a general linkage provision in the process of elaborating
more specific rules. The rules adopted by the COP for AIJ severely restricted the use of this
mechanism, by providing that developed countries could not count activities implemented jointly
with developing countries towards fulfillment of their commitments and by providing that such
activities are “supplemental, and should only be treated as a subsidiary means of achieving the
objective of the Convention” (UNFCCC, 1995, Decision 5/CP.1, par. c). In practice, comparatively
few activities implemented jointly were initiated under the UNFCCC (UNFCCC, 2006).

4.3.2 Kyoto Protocol
The Kyoto Protocol went much further in promoting linkage: it established three linkage
mechanisms—International Emissions Trading, Joint Implementation, and the Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM)—and by allowing transferred units to count towards international
compliance.30 In contrast to the UNFCCC experience with AIJ, nations ultimately agreed to
detailed rules for operationalizing these three linkage mechanisms in the 2001 Marrakesh Accords
(UNFCCC, 2001).
The rules elaborated under the Kyoto Protocol illustrate the basic infrastructure required to allow
linkages for international compliance purposes. Key elements of this infrastructure include:

30

•

Definition of a common compliance unit, denominated in terms of metric tons of
CO2 equivalent emissions (UNFCCC, 1998, Article 3).

•

An international accounting system for tracking transfers and preventing double
counting, through the international transaction log (ITL).

In addition to promoting international linkage, Article 2.1(a)(v) of the Kyoto Protocol implicitly endorses
the use of market instruments at the national level by encouraging participating parties to reduce or phase
out “market imperfections, fiscal incentives, tax and duty exemptions and subsidies in all greenhouse gas
emitting sectors that run counter to the objective of the Convention and application of market instruments”
(UNFCCC, 1998).
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•

Minimum standards regarding MRV, to ensure that all parties participating in
the Protocol’s market mechanisms achieve a basic level of environmental integrity
(UNFCCC 1998, Articles 5, 7, 8; UNFCCC, 2001: Marrakesh decisions on national
emissions inventory systems and national registries).31

•

An international credit system—the CDM—to ensure that emissions credits meet a
basic level of environmental integrity (UNFCCC, 2008, Article 12).

Experience with the Kyoto Protocol also illustrates that creating an international infrastructure
to allow linkage for international compliance purposes does not ensure that countries will, in
fact, link their national mitigation systems. The Protocol permits parties to link their national
mitigation policies and addresses some of the key issues raised by bilateral linkage—for example,
it establishes common MRV standards, thereby streamlining the linkage process. But the Protocol
does not require parties to link, nor does it address all of the issues involved in linkage—and
comparatively little linkage has actually occurred. For example, the European Union, from the
outset, has imposed more restrictions than the Protocol on the use of international credits and
has progressively restricted the use of CDM credits in its emissions trading system over time.
In practice, if two Kyoto Protocol Parties wish to link, they must negotiate a bilateral linkage
agreement, rather than rely solely on the Kyoto Protocol rules.

4.3.3 Framework for Various Approaches
As discussed in section 3.3.3, although the progress of FVA negotiations has been fitful thus far,
the FVA could provide a platform for the elaboration of rules for linking heterogeneous national
systems to limit emissions.

4.3.4 Partnership for Market Readiness
The Partnership for Market Readiness (PMR) is a World Bank initiative intended to promote
the use of market-based instruments, such as emissions trading, in national mitigation policies.
Although the PMR largely focuses on capacity building, it also has a harmonizing effect through
its promotion of common approaches to issues such as MRV, baseline setting, and crediting, and
thereby could help facilitate linkages among national systems (World Bank, 2014c).

4.3.5 ICAO and IMO
Finally, both the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the International
Maritime Organization (IMO) are exploring the use of market-based measures (MBMs) to reduce
31

For example, the Marrakesh Accords (UNFCCC, 2001) set forth minimum rules for national systems to inventory greenhouse gas
emissions and for national registries of compliance units. Compliance with these minimum standards is a condition for participation in
the Protocol’s market mechanisms.
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emissions from international civil aviation and maritime transport (Van Asselt, 2014). Although
these MBMs would serve the same function as linkage—namely, to equalize carbon prices across
countries—they are generally being envisioned as uniform international trading systems rather
than as linked national systems.

4.4 Elements of a 2015 Paris Agreement
The contents of the Paris outcome are still highly uncertain, so it is difficult to specify in detail
how the Paris outcome might address linkage issues. For example, if the Paris outcome makes
parties’ NDCs legally binding, then linkage could play an important role in enabling countries to
comply with their NDCs, through transfers among parties. Conversely, if NDCs are not legally
binding, then transfers of contributions among parties would not serve a compliance function,
although they could still serve as an indicator of a party’s commitment to fulfilling its NDC.
Nevertheless, the broad contours of the 2015 outcome are beginning to come into focus and it is
possible to make some preliminary observations about how linkage issues might be addressed. The
2015 outcome is likely to include, at its core, a legally binding agreement that establishes parties’
basic commitments as well as the regime’s institutional arrangements. Given the difficulties of
negotiating a legally-binding agreement in the relatively little time remaining before the Paris
COP, as well as the difficulty, for some countries, of ratifying an elaborate agreement, the 2015
agreement is likely to be comparatively brief, addressing only essential issues and doing so in
a minimalist manner. More detailed rules addressing issues such as linkage are likely to be put
forward in COP decisions. These could be adopted concurrently with the core agreement, as part
of the 2015 outcome, or, more likely, the Paris agreement could authorize the COP to adopt rules
on linkage at subsequent sessions.
If the Paris agreement leaves the development of rules on linkage to future COP decisions, a key
question will be whether these rules must be adopted before linkage can occur. If so, opponents
of linkage would have tremendous leverage, since COP decisions require consensus. Alternatively,
the Paris agreement could allow parties to move forward with linkage while simply authorizing
the COP to adopt additional rules regarding linkage at a future date.

4.4.1 Authorization of linkage
The 2015 agreement may not need to authorize linkage between parties, because linkage is already
authorized by Article 4.2(a) of the UNFCCC (discussed in section 4.3.1; UNFCCC, 1992).
Nevertheless, an explicit statement that parties may transfer portions of their NDCs to other
parties and that parties can use transferred units from other jurisdictions to demonstrate that they
have met their NDC commitments would be helpful in providing certainty both to governments
and to private market participants. Some statement of this sort is likely a necessary condition for
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widespread linkage to occur. In addition, if it were deemed desirable to allow linkages between
parties and non-parties to the new agreement, the agreement should explicitly authorize such
linkages.32 Similarly, the core agreement might authorize the use of CDM credits by parties in
achieving their NDCs, thereby providing a common crediting platform for the 2015 agreement.

4.4.2 Minimum standards to ensure environmental integrity
Rules aimed at ensuring environmental integrity could, in theory, be contained in the core 2015
agreement itself or in subsequent COP decisions. But it is unlikely that detailed rules for linkage
can be developed in time for inclusion in the core agreement. Nor would including such detailed
rules in the core agreement be desirable. Given the difficulties of amending a legally binding
instrument, including linkage rules in the core agreement would make it difficult for these rules
to evolve in light of experience.
For this reason, minimum standards to ensure environmental integrity should be elaborated in
COP decisions—this would include, for example, establishing the requirements for national
and international MRV, registries, and crediting mechanisms (Hood et al., 2014; Tuerk et al.,
2009). In this case, the function of the core agreement with respect to linkage might be confined
to articulating general principles related to environmental integrity, while also authorizing the
COP, or another organization, to develop more detailed rules. Minimum standards would not
require uniformity among national systems or linkage agreements. MRV and crediting procedures
only need to be credible in order for linkage to occur and be sustained, not identical (Tuerk et
al., 2009). Parties could have some flexibility in designing their national systems for MRV and
crediting, so long as their systems satisfied the agreement’s minimum requirements.
As noted earlier, most minimum standards for trade and financial linkages have been developed
through soft-law instruments, because these instruments are typically easier to negotiate and adopt
and can also be revised more easily, allowing them to evolve over time in response to changing
needs and circumstances (Brummer, 2011). Rules for multilateral linkage could also be developed
outside the UNFCCC process, by institutions that bring together national regulators, market
participants, and private experts. The ISO is one possibility (Metcalf and Weisbach, 2012), but a
new, informal institution addressing mitigation linkage is another alternative.
Whatever minimum standards are adopted for multilateral linkage, international oversight of
compliance would be important, to ensure the integrity both of the 2015 agreement (to the
extent transfers are permitted for international compliance purposes) and of the linked national
systems (to the extent transfers count towards domestic compliance). Oversight functions could
32

Although allowing linkages with non-parties would enhance cost-effectiveness, it would diminish the incentive of non-parties to join the
agreement.

38 « FACILITATING LINKAGE OF HETEROGENEOUS REGIONAL, NATIONAL, AND SUB-NATIONAL CLIMATE POLICIES THROUGH A FUTURE INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT

be performed by a UNFCCC institution such as the expert review groups that currently review
Annex I inventories, by national authorities in linked systems, or by an outside body.33

4.4.3 Default/Model Rules
Many elements of GHG linkage could be addressed through default or model rules, from which
states are free to deviate at their discretion. For example, a model rule might define key terms,
including the compliance units (e.g., metric tons CO2 equivalent). Rules that may benefit from
this approach are typically concerned with the details of linking two regulatory systems. For
example, two nations interested in linking their GHG cap-and-trade systems would have to
consider rules regarding market coverage, cost containment, banking and borrowing, compliance
periods, allocation methods, and the treatment of new emitters and emitter closures (Tuerk et al.,
2009; Metcalf and Weisbach 2012). Additional rules would be desirable for linking heterogeneous
systems. For example, efforts to link a tax system and a cap-and-trade system must consider the
treatment of emission tax payment credits (Metcalf and Weisbach, 2012).
Developing uniform rules to address all of these issues is unrealistic. Current and planned
regulatory systems for GHG mitigation vary significantly in size, design, characteristics, and
scope. They are tailored to achieve domestic policy objectives and reflect domestic circumstances
and the domestic evolution of climate policy (Tuerk et al., 2009). Thus, rules for linking disparate
systems would likely need to be too different to support a uniform or even minimum-standard
approach.
Despite the need for local flexibility, a degree of harmonization could be achieved through default
rules that facilitate linkage by providing a common framework for governments to use when
developing their own bilateral or plurilateral linkage agreements. In other words, countries would
not need to develop bilateral agreements from scratch; they could choose to adopt some or all of
the default rules and thereby shorten the time needed to develop linkage agreements. In addition,
the existence of default rules may encourage efforts to harmonize disparate systems over time. As
nations reform and update their linkage agreements, they may choose to match the default rules
more closely. Over the long term, such harmonization would reduce transaction costs for market
participants by reducing the number of different rules that must be learned and complied with.34
33

Examples of international oversight procedures intended to limit systemic risks include the IMF’s FSAP, the FATF’s peer review process
to ensure compliance with the FATF’s anti-money-laundering standards (see section 3.1.3.1 for FSAP and FATF), and Reports on
Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSCs), which are carried out by the IMF (Scott and Gelpern, 2012; Brummer, 2011).

34

The Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) and the OECD Model Tax Convention (OECDMTC) illustrate
the role of default rules in lowering transaction costs. The CISG provides a set of substantive rules that parties can use to prepare contracts;
these have become a lingua franca of international commerce (Kröll et al., 2011) and are enforceable in domestic courts. The OECDMTC
serves as a basis for over 225 bilateral tax treaties (Miller and Oats 2014). Although the OECDMTC is not binding on any nation, the
terms of the convention are so commonly adopted as part of bilateral treaties that they represent, in effect, default rules for bilateral
linkages between tax systems.

HARVARD PROJECT ON CLIMATE AGREEMENTS • HARVARD KENNEDY SCHOOL » 39

Default rules for GHG linkage could be developed by the COP or by an outside institution,
and could be adopted via a hard-law multilateral convention or a soft-law approach. The hardlaw approach would deliver maximal certainty and likely has the greatest chance of eventually
creating de facto uniform rules. However, a hard-law approach also has several disadvantages.
Negotiations may be difficult if not impossible given the disparities between existing and planned
systems. Furthermore, because linked carbon markets are a relatively recent phenomenon, rules
that appear optimal today may not be optimal in the future. A model-law approach would provide
flexibility and allow default rules to evolve through an iterative process, just as model tax treaties
have evolved over time.35 Once linked carbon markets are mature—perhaps decades in the
future—a multilateral convention might be appropriate to encourage the default rules to evolve
into uniform rules that would reduce transaction costs.

5. CONCLUSION
The upcoming Paris agreement is a critical next step in the on-going international process to
reduce global GHG emissions. Whether the agreement will be sufficiently ambitious to put the
world on a path toward limiting global average warming to 2 degrees Celsius, as Parties to the
UNFCCC have called for, remains to be seen. In general, greater ambition is more easily realized
when its costs are low. Market-based mechanisms are an important element in the portfolio of
potential actions that can lead to cost-effective solutions. Linkage—between and among market
and non-market systems for reducing GHG emissions—is another key element. This paper’s
contribution is to catalog and assess a variety of ways in which the Paris agreement, and more
generally the on-going negotiations, can facilitate and advance linked systems.
If linkage is to play a significant role in a hybrid international policy architecture, then several
categories of design elements merit serious consideration for inclusion in the Paris agreement,
either directly or by establishing a process for subsequent international negotiations. In general,
effective linkage requires common definitions of key terms, including particularly the units to be
used for compliance purposes. This will be particularly important for links between heterogeneous
systems, and it is an area where a model rule could be particularly helpful.
Second, linkage requires registries and tracking mechanisms, whether the systems being linked are
homogeneous or heterogeneous. Indeed, a key role for the top-down part of a hybrid architecture
that allows for international linkage of national policy instruments will be the tracking, reporting,
and recording of allowance unit transactions. International compliance units would make the
functioning of an international transaction log more straightforward and reduce the administrative
burden of reconciling international registries with national registries. Minimum standards for
35

In the U.S. context, the Clean Air Task Force has proposed that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency issue a model rule for
interstate emissions trading, under its proposed power plant rule under section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act (Clean Air Task Force, 2014).
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approving and measuring offsets may be important. And market oversight and monitoring may
increase confidence in the system, although in some cases, national and international institutions
that can provide oversight may already exist or may need only relatively minor additional capacity
to assume these functions.
Including detailed linkage rules in the core Paris agreement is not desirable as this could make
it difficult for rules to evolve in light of experience. Instead, minimum standards to ensure
environmental integrity should be elaborated in COP decisions—for example, the COP could
establish minimum requirements for national MRV, registries, and crediting mechanisms. In
terms of linkage, the function of the core Paris agreement might be confined to articulating
general principles relating to environmental integrity, while also authorizing the COP or
another organization to develop more detailed rules. Whatever minimum standards are adopted,
international oversight of compliance will be important to ensure the integrity both of the 2015
agreement and of linked national systems.
Many elements of GHG linkage can be addressed through default or model rules that nations are
free to deviate from at their discretion. Rules that may benefit from this approach are typically
concerned with the details of linking two regulatory systems. For example, nations interested
in linking their cap-and-trade systems would have to consider rules for market coverage, cost
containment, banking and borrowing, compliance periods, allocation methods, and the treatment
of new emitters and emitter closures. Additional rules may be needed for linking of heterogeneous
systems.
Developing uniform rules to address all of these issues is unrealistic. Instead, a degree of
harmonization could be achieved through default rules that facilitate linkage by providing a
common framework for nations to use when developing their own linkage agreements. Although
there is no need for the 2015 agreement itself to elaborate harmonized linkage rules, the agreement
might authorize the COP to develop default linkage rules that nations can use in negotiating
bilateral linkage agreements.
Ultimately, the most valuable outcome of the Paris agreement regarding linkage might simply be
the inclusion of an explicit statement that parties may transfer portions of their NDCs to other
parties and that these transferred units may be used by the transferees to meet NDC commitments.
From a legal perspective, such a statement would help provide certainty both to governments
and private market participants and is likely a necessary condition for widespread linkage to
occur. Such a minimalist approach will allow diverse forms of linkage to arise among what will
inevitably be heterogeneous NDCs, thereby advancing the dual objectives of cost-effectiveness
and environmental integrity in the international climate policy regime.

HARVARD PROJECT ON CLIMATE AGREEMENTS • HARVARD KENNEDY SCHOOL » 41

Table 1: Linkages Between Emissions Trading Systems
System 1

System 2

Type of
Linkage

Enact.
Date

Effect.
Date

Prices at Enactment

Caps (mtCO2)

#1

#2

#1

#2

Notes and
References

2003

2005
2005
2008
2008
2008

none

na

varied

2,299

€0
none
none

€20
€20
€20

15
0
18

2,080
2,080
2,080

2014
2018

AUD$25
AUD$25

€7-€8
€7-€8

TBD
TBD
TBD

1,852

2014
2014
2009
2009
2014
2012

$14
none
none
$3
$2

none
na
€9/EUA
€5/EUA
$2

160
varied
168
91
21

25
168
2,299
2,299
150

2004
2004
2004
2004
2012
1999
2008
2011
2005
2013
*
*
2008

2005
2008
2013
2008
2013
2008
2008
2012/15
2009
2014

€9
€9
€9
€9
€6
none
none
none
none
none

$5
$5
$5
$6
€4
$4-$7
€11
€6
$5-8
$5

2,299
2,299
2,299
2,299
2,084
na
na
TBD
110
165

D
D
D,E
D

2010

$142

$18

13

na
na
na
na
na
na
na
na
na
na
na
na
na

2013
2013

2014
2016

none

€.4

na

na

H

Linkages among cap-and-trade systems

27 EU nations
Norway
Norway
Iceland
Liechtenstein
Switzerland
Australia
Australia
Australia
Australia
California
10 U.S. states
RGGI
RGGI
New Jersey

(via the EU ETS)
EU ETS
EU ETS
EU ETS
EU ETS
EU ETS
EU ETS
EU ETS
New Zealand
EU ETS, NZ
Quebec
(RGGI)
Any CAT system
Any CAT system
RGGI

Multi
One-way
Multi
Multi
Multi
Two-way
One-way
Two-way
Two-way
Delinking
Two-way
Multi
One-way
Delinking
Delinking

2007
2007
2007
*
2013*
*
*
2014
2012/13
2005
2005
2013
2011

G

C

A
B
B

1, 12
10
2
2
2
3
4, 11
4
5
24
6, 14,15
7
8
9
13

Linkages from cap-and-trade systems to credit systems

EU ETS Phase 1
EU ETS Phase 2
EU ETS Phase 3
EU ETS Phase 2
EU ETS Phase 3
Switzerland
New Zealand
Australia
RGGI
RGGI
California
Quebec
Tokyo ETS

CDM
CDM
CDM
JI
Non-LDC CDM
CDM
CDM, JI, RMU
CDM, JI
Any credit system
Any credit system
Acre and Chiapas
Acre and Chiapas
CDM

One-way
One-way
One-way
One-way
Delinking
One-way
One-way
One-way
One-way
Delinking
One-way
One-way
One-way

B
B

F

1, 16, 17
1, 16, 17
1, 16, 22
1, 16, 18
26
17, 19
17, 20, 21
4
8
9
25
25
23

Linkage from carbon tax to credit systems

Mexico
South Africa

CDM
CDM, VCS

One-Way
One-Way

27
28

* indicates a proposed linkage.
A
The RGGI states signed a MOU in 2005, and then each passed authorizing legislation between 2006 and 2008.
B
The original Model Rule included language (section XX-10.3(b)(1)) allowing the use of allowances from foreign cap-and-trade or credit systems
(including Kyoto flexibility mechanisms) if RGGI allowance prices exceeded a “two-stage price trigger event” that began at $10 in 2005 and increased
by roughly 2 percent each year. The 2013 amendments to the Model Rule eliminated this linkage.
C
Participants in Australia’s system may use EUAs for up to 50 percent of their compliance obligations.
D
Credit price reflects pre-compliance offsets for which seller assumes risk.
E
Under recent proposed rules, EU ETS participants will be entitled to use international credits during the 2012-2020 period up to the higher of
two limits: (a) the international credit entitlement specified in the national allocation plan for Phase 2; or (b) 11 percent of the free allocation of EU
allowances granted to them in that period.
F
Use of CDM credits is allowed only if domestic prices exceed a threshold, and if Tokyo-based credits are used as well.
G
Per EEA Joint Committee decision 146/2007, Iceland did not submit a National Allocation Plan for EU ETS Phase II, since it had no installations
large enough to be covered by the cap-and-trade system.
H
Mexico allows companies to pay with CDM credits in lieu of tax payments equal to the credit market value at the time of paying the tax; however,
only CDM projects developed in Mexico can be used in this way. The price shown in the table if from RGGI.
Sources: 1 European Parliament (2004); 2 European Commission (2007b); 3 European Commission (2010); 4 Australia (2013); 5 Combet and Grosner
(2011); 6 CARB (2013a); 7 RGGI (2008); 8 RGGI (2013a); 9 RGGI (2013b), Mehling and Haites (2009); 10 Sopher and Mansell (2013a); 11 European
Commission (2012, 2013a); 12 European Commission (2007a); 13 NJ.com (2011); 14 CARB (2013b); 15 Quebec MDDEFP (2013); 16 Sijm (2009, 21);
17
UNDP (2006); 18 Allen Consulting Group (2005); 19 Sopher and Mansell (2013b); 20 New Zealand Parliament (2008); 21 New Zealand Ministry of
the Environment (2011); 22 European Commission (2013b); 23 EDF and IETA (2013); 24 ClimateWire, 2013; 25 EDF (2010); 26 European Commission
(2011b); 27 World Bank (2014a, 81), SendeCO2 (2014). 28 South Africa National Treasury (2014).					
SOURCE: Ranson and Stavins 2013a, updated by Ranson October 2014.
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